We then derive a test statistic for establishing when it is optimal to raise the reserve price. offshore oil sales and find evidence that the reserve price is dramatically too low.
This statistic is independent of the distribution of valuations. Date: 1992-01 References: View complete reference list from Cit Ec Citations View citations in Econ Papers (18) Track citations by RSS feed Downloads: (external link) text (application/pdf) Related works: Journal Article: Updating the Reserve Price in Common-Value Auctions (1992) This item may be available elsewhere in Econ Papers: Search for items with the same title.
Like all well-designed economic mechanisms, the designer assumes that individuals will act strategically and may hold private William Vickrey first established the taxonomy of auctions based on the order in which the auctioneer quotes prices and the bidders tender their bids.
Because the winner pays his bid, this type of auction is known as a first-price auction.
The Dutch auction, also a first-price auction, is descending.
Senate Testimony, April 25, 2001, Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs, Foreign Commerce, and Tourism.
PUBLICATIONS: CHAPTERS IN BOOKS PATENTS Patent 6,718,312, with Paul Milgrom Patent 7,689,627 Patent 7,747,680, with Ravi Kumar and Andrew Tomkins Patent 7,962,851, with Ravi Kumar and Andrew Tomkins Patent 8,156,032, with Chi Chao Chang, Darshan Kantak, and Sai-Ming (Eliot) Li. UNPUBLISHED MANUSCRIPTS ADVANCED LECTURES Pricing Lectures (Draft Course) Competitive Solutions Minicourse 2005 Lectures on Vertical Integration Given to the FCC, 2003 Pricing Lectures Given in Amsterdam at NAKE, 2001 Auction Design for the Real World, 1995 Mathematics for economics, 1986 MISCELLANEOUS The Cost of Annoying Ads, ACM Special Interest Group on Electronic Commerce(SIGecom) Exchanges, forthcoming (with Dan Goldstein and Sid Suri).
He has studied dynamic bargaining with asymmetric information and the theory of auctions.
His current research is on revenue maximizing selling mechanisms for sellers with more than one object - an area sometimes referred to as "multidimensional mechanism design." Other research interests include industrial organization theory, with a focus on two-sided markets and on antitrust issues. Recent papers include "Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation in the Independent Private Values Model" (Econometrica,2010), "Multidimensional Mechanism Design" and "Bundling as an Optimal Selling Mechanism for a Multi-Good Monopolist" (both jointly authored with Alejandro Manelli and both in the Journal of Economic Theory) as well as "The No Surcharge Rule and Buyer Rebates: Vertical Control by a Payments Network" with Marius Schwartz in the Review of Network Economics.
Patent 8,174,974, with John Langford and Kishore Papineni. Notes from the EC 13 Program Chairs, ACM Special Interest Group on Electronic Commerce(SIGecom) Exchanges 12, no.
Patent 8,538,809, with Darshan Kantak, Eliot Li, Michael Schwarz, and Jack Xie.
hen most people hear the word “auction,” they think of the open-outcry, ascending-bid (or English) auction. Fundamentally, an auction is an economic mechanism whose purpose is the allocation of goods and the formation of prices for those goods via a process known as bidding.